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Abstract 
Contextual theories of political behaviour assert that the contexts in which people live influence their 
political beliefs and vote choices. Most studies of political assimilation, however, rely on cross-sectional 
data and fail to distinguish contextual influence from self-selection of individuals into areas. This paper 
advances understanding of this longstanding controversy by tracking thousands of individuals over an 
18-year period in England. We observe individual-level left-right position and party identification before 
and after residential moves across areas with different political orientations. We find evidence of both 
non-random selection into areas and assimilation of new entrants to the majority political orientation. 
However, these effects are contingent on the type of area an individual moves to and, moreover, 
contextual effects are weak and dominated by the larger effect of self-selection into areas.  
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Introduction1 
It is unexceptional to remark that the political preferences of a national population are not randomly 
distributed across geographical areas. We know considerably less, however, about how this spatial 
clustering comes about. Contextual theories of political behaviour assert that elements of the 
environment in which individuals are situated exert a causal influence on the political parties and policies 
they prefer.2 People, the argument goes, progressively assimilate through a variety of social-
psychological mechanisms to the dominant political orientation of the environments in which they live. 
Consistent with these theories, a long tradition of research in electoral geography has examined the 
cross-sectional correlation between individual political preferences and social and political 
characteristics of local contexts.3  
Despite the large body of existing research in this area, however, the question of whether local 
contexts actually cause political preferences to change remains contested. Scholars have long argued 
that the correlation between individual political preferences and contextual characteristics is driven, in 
whole or in part, by self-selection of people into areas with congruent political beliefs.4 It is our 
contention in this paper that this longstanding debate remains unresolved because previous studies 
based on cross-sectional data have not been able to convincingly separate self-selection and contextual 
                                                          
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Economic and Social Research Council through the grant for the 
National Centre for Research Methods (NCRM; grant reference: RES-576-47-5001-01) and from the Marie Curie Actions of 
the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme under REA grant agreement n° 334054 (PCIG12-GA-2012-334054). 
2 Agnew 1987; Books and Prysby 1988; Burbank 1997; Cox 1969; Ethington and McDaniel 2007; Huckfeldt and Sprague 
1995; Johnston and Pattie 2006. 
3 Andersen and Heath 2002; Butler and Stokes 1974; Crewe and Payne 1976; Johnston et al. 2004; Johnston, Pattie, and 
Allsopp 1988; McAllister et al. 2001; 2001; Miller 1978. 
4 Dunleavy 1979; Kelley and McAllister 1985; King 1996; McAllister and Studlar 1992. 
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effects from one another. Although falling some way short of the gold standard of random assignment of 
individuals to areas, a longitudinal research design provides a considerably more satisfactory means of 
identifying the independent effects of assimilation and self-selection. This is because panel data enable 
the tracking of changes in political preferences before and after individuals move to contexts with 
different political majorities. Yet, because of the strong data requirements that longitudinal approaches 
impose, few examples of this type of strategy can be found in the existing literature.  
This paper advances understanding in this area by assessing the causal effect of contexts on 
individual political orientations by tracking the preferences of individuals before and after residential 
moves, over an 18 year period. We do not seek to address the full range of causes and political 
consequences of internal migration, but focus our attention on two narrow yet fundamental research 
questions: Do people select into areas that exhibit majority political beliefs congruent with their own? 
And, are individual political preferences influenced by the political orientation of the area in which an 
individual moves to? To foreshadow our later results, our findings show that people are more likely to 
choose areas to live in that are congruent with their pre-existing political preferences. However, political 
orientation plays only a very limited, if any, role in location choice. Rather it is the socio-economic 
characteristics of individuals which are correlated with political preference, such as work and parental 
status, which are consequential in this regard. Self-selection into areas occurs, in short, for non-political 
reasons. We also find that in the years following a residential move, an individual’s political preferences 
become more aligned with the majority political orientation of the area that they moved to. However, this 
process of assimilation is both weak and contingent upon area type; in England only those moving into 
strongly Conservative areas from other types of area exhibit evidence of contextual effects.  
Establishing that both self-selection and, albeit limited, contextual effects exist is important for 
several reasons. In a fundamental sense, it provides political scientists with a better understanding of 
the origins political preferences. From a more practical perspective, both processes are likely to have 
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important political consequences because they produce, over time, more spatially polarized political 
preferences. In politically homogeneous communities, residents are less likely to be exposed to diverse 
opinions, with negative implications for social and political tolerance, and the majority party will have 
larger margins of victory, resulting in less competitive elections. Geographical polarization of political 
preferences has also been shown to generate electoral biases in the translation from votes to seats in 
majoritarian systems and affects the incentives of parties to modify their policy platforms.5  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, we review the existing literature on 
the geographical clustering of political preferences. A discussion of the limitations of existing 
methodological approaches to untangling contextual effects and selection mechanisms leads us to 
conclude that a longitudinal research strategy is required. We then describe the data set and key 
measures to be used in our analysis and detail our model fitting strategy, before presenting our empirical 
results. We conclude with a discussion of the limitations of our own approach and a consideration of the 
substantive implications of our findings.  
 
The source of the spatial clustering of political preferences: Contextual effects or selection?  
Scholars have argued that contextual influence occurs through a variety of social-psychological 
mechanisms,6 including interpersonal contact and persuasion,7 party mobilization,8 exposure to shared 
                                                          
5 Chen and Rodden 2009; Rodden 2010; 2012. 
6 While existing work focuses mostly on social mechanisms, other contextual characteristics such as climate or geographic 
features can also conceivably affect political behavior. 
7 Butler and Stokes 1974; Huckfeldt, Ikeda, and Pappi 2005; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995. 
8 Denver and Hands 1997; Pattie, Johnston, and Fieldhouse 1995. 
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local socio-economic conditions,9 common local interests,10 and exposure to low-intensity information 
cues.11 For instance, theories of interpersonal contact argue that members of the political majority will 
tend to have their views reinforced, whereas those in the minority will change their views through 
processes of persuasion and conformity, generating a more homogeneous community outlook over 
time. Strong local party branches can also persuade local residents to change their political views 
through outreach activities. 
A large body of empirical evidence supports the main prediction of contextual theories in 
showing that there is a robust correlation between individual political preferences and area level 
characteristics. For instance, Butler and Stokes12 showed that residents of UK parliamentary 
constituencies vote for the local majority more frequently than would be expected for the population as a 
whole. Similar correlations between measures of aggregate political orientations and individual political 
preferences have been replicated many times since.13 Other studies have shown that socio-economic 
characteristics of neighbourhoods, variously defined and measured, predict vote choice above and 
beyond individual level characteristics.14 Many studies have also found evidence consistent with the 
mechanisms hypothesized to underpin assimilation effects, such as interpersonal discussion or political 
mobilization.15 
                                                          
9 Books and Prysby 1988. 
10 Cutler 2007. 
11 Cho and Rudolph 2008; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992. 
12 1974. 
13 e.g. Cox 1969; Crewe and Payne 1976; Taylor and Johnston 1979. 
14 e.g. Andersen and Heath 2002; Johnston et al. 2005; Johnston, Pattie, and Allsopp 1988; McAllister et al. 2001; Miller 
1978. 
15 For a review see Johnston and Pattie 2006. 
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While the large majority of existing studies rely on cross-sectional evidence, some have used 
short-run panels. Johnston et al.16 show with BHPS data that people in the same constituency changed 
their votes in similar directions across elections in 1992 and 1997, leading them to conclude that “place 
matters” (p.107). Pattie and Johnston17 examine the characteristics of individuals who switched parties 
between the 1987 and 1992 General Elections in the UK and find that people reporting discussion 
partners who support a different party were more likely to change allegiance. However, these two-wave 
studies remain somewhat inconclusive about causal order. That is to say, it may be the case that 
individuals who do not identify strongly with a party are both more likely to select discussion partners 
with different opinions and to switch parties. Hence, with only a few exceptions, it is still true that “the 
standard approach in studies of context is to examine the effect that an aggregate-level compositional 
measure has on an individual behavior or attitude (…) covariation between the individual variable and 
aggregate variable is taken as evidence of a contextual effect.”18  
There are good reasons to assume that an individual’s choice of a residential location will be 
correlated with prior political preferences. While it is unlikely that political preferences have a strong 
direct causal effect on residential choices, an indirect influence seems more plausible. This is because, 
when deciding where to relocate, movers must balance a broad range of preferences and constraints, 
including local housing prices, distance to work, quality of services, and tastes over the type of 
neighbourhood and the features of the house.19 Political preferences are correlated with the socio-
economic characteristics that constrain destinations choice, such as income and family situation. 
                                                          
16 2001. 
17 2000. 
18 Baybeck and McClurg 2005, 494. 
19 Rabe and Taylor 2010. 
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Preferences are also correlated with tastes for many types of public goods (safety, scenic landscapes, 
cultural events, nightlife) which different localities provide.20 Because of differences in both socio-
economic constraints and location preferences we expect that those on the left and on the right will 
exhibit different location choices when they move and, specifically, that they will be more likely to move 
to politically like-minded communities.  
Recent research on the dynamics of partisan support have shown that, for the US case at least, 
movers tend to select areas that have majority political preferences more similar to their own than their 
origin location.21 While these studies provide evidence of non-random selection into areas, they tell us 
nothing about contextual effects and do not examine whether self-selection is political in nature. 
Consistent with the view that self-selection trumps contextual effects, critics of contextual effect theories 
have pointed out that the correlation between contextual characteristics and individual preferences 
generally becomes negligible, or zero, when controlling for individual level characteristics.22 Hence, 
summarizing the critics’ position in the debate, King concludes that “The geographical variation is 
usually quite large to begin with, but after we control for what we have learned about voters, there isn’t 
much left for contextual effects.”23  
 Concerns about selection bias can, of course, be mitigated by controlling for socio-economic 
characteristics which influence both the propensity to move and political preferences. A conditioning 
strategy, though, requires that all the requisite control variables are known and measurable, which 
                                                          
20 e.g. see Florida 2003 on cities of the creative class; and Tiebout 1956 on political orientation and preferred bundles of 
taxes and services. 
21 Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2012; McDonald 2011. 
22 Kelley and McAllister 1985; McAllister and Studlar 1992. 
23 1996, 160. 
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seems unrealistic given many of the candidate variables are notoriously difficult to measure in surveys 
(e.g. housing tastes, early socialization experiences, personality). Thus, statistical control using cross-
sectional data is unlikely to be a wholly effective strategy for dealing with selection bias. In summary, 
despite advances in both data and method, doubts remain over the core claim of theories of contextual 
effects: that contexts cause changes in political attitudes and behaviour.  
A more robust strategy for estimating the effects of contexts on political preferences is to make 
use of data containing longitudinal information about the same individuals over time. The primary 
advantage of repeated measures, or panel data is that, under certain model specifications, it is possible 
to partial out all observed and unobserved time-invariant characteristics of individual units 24. As Halaby 
puts it, “the problem of causal inference is fundamentally one of unobservables, and unobservables are 
at the heart of the contribution of panel data to solving problems of causal inference”25 (2003: 2). The 
incorporation of a longitudinal dimension yields crucial additional leverage on questions of causal order, 
making it possible to model within-individual change as a function of preceding events.26 Because this 
approach is based on the analysis of change in both dependent and independent variables within 
individuals over time, the estimated model coefficients are purged of the effects of all fixed (or ‘time-
invariant’) respondent characteristics. Such fixed characteristics comprise both the ‘usual suspects’ such 
as gender, age cohort, and ethnicity, as well as less easily measurable variables such as personality 
traits and pre-adult socialization experiences. We are unaware of any existing study which has used this 
type of design to evaluate the extent and magnitude of self-selection and political assimilation to areas. 
The present paper is motivated by the need to address this longstanding lacuna. 
                                                          
24 Halaby 2003; 2004; Wooldridge 2002. 
25 2003, 2. 
26 Allison 1994. 
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Data and Methodology 
To estimate the effect of area level political orientation on individual political preferences, we use the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). We track individuals who move across electoral constituencies 
over an 18 year period and observe if movers are more likely to choose constituencies where their pre-
existing views are closer to the views of existing residents than other potential choices of location (self-
selection).  Additionally, we evaluate whether self-selection effects observed are political in nature, 
which is to say that individuals choose ‘like-minded’ areas because of their political orientation. We also 
assess whether individuals adopt the political preferences prevalent in their new contexts over time. 
 
Sample 
The BHPS is a large, high-quality repeated measures survey which has interviewed a stratified, multi-
stage, random sample of British households annually since 1991. Computer assisted face-to-face 
interviews are attempted with all household members aged 16 years or above. The initial wave 1 
household response rate was 74%. Extensive efforts are made to track responding individuals across 
waves when a household moves address, or when an individual moves from an existing household to a 
new one, such as when adult children leave home, or when a cohabiting couple separate. The study 
achieves a tracking rate averaging 95% across all waves. The BHPS is thus ideally suited to our 
objectives because it contains a large number of residentially mobile individuals for whom self-reports of 
political preferences are observed before and after a move.   
Our analysis uses 18 waves of data from 1991 to 2008 inclusive, with almost 10,000 individuals 
clustered within over 5000 households in the first wave (1991). We restrict our focus to England only, 
excluding households in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland because the party systems in these 
countries are sufficiently different from England to make combined analyses difficult to interpret. We also 
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exclude observations aged below 18 in order to match our analysis sample with the voting age 
population in England. We include ‘new sample members’ who join the BHPS through the formation of 
new households with ‘original sample members’ as well as ‘re-entrants’ (i.e. those who had been non-
respondents at the previous wave). These inclusion criteria yield an analysis sample of 17,373 
individuals, who provide a combined total of 158,000 unique observations over the 18 waves. The 
average number of waves completed by individuals is 9.14 and 4,100 individuals responded in all 18 
waves. To deal with the issue of non-random attrition we include a range of control variables that are 
predictive of drop-out from the study. Our estimates are therefore unbiased under the missing at random 
(MAR) assumption which we consider to be plausible in the current context.27  
 
Individual Political Preferences 
The BHPS offers two options for specifying individual political preferences. The first is a standard 
measure of party identification which is administered in all 18 waves; the second is a multi-item scale 
designed to measure people’s ‘left-right’ economic value orientation28 which was administered in waves 
1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 14, and 17. Each measure has contrasting advantages and disadvantages. Party 
identification is measured in every wave and enables us to detect potential assimilation effects which are 
not based on changes in an individual’s underlying preferences and beliefs, for example as a result of 
differences in the quality of candidates. On the other hand, the left-right scale provides a finer-grained 
measure of political orientation, which enables detection of smaller changes across and within 
                                                          
27 That is, we consider it unlikely that political orientation is a strong determinant of drop-out from the study. Although the 
BHPS contains a longitudinal weight, using this to correct for differential attrition is not attractive because any unit with a 
single missing wave of data over the 18 years of observation is dropped from the weighted estimator. 
28 Evans, Heath, and Lalljee 1996; Heath, Evans, and Martin 1994. 
11 
 
individuals over time and is not subject to the potentially distorting influence of tactical voting.  Due to 
their differing theoretical and empirical properties we undertake all analyses using both measures of 
political preference. For the left-right scale, we take the first principal component of the six items which is 
appropriate for these items.29 For party identification, we consider only supporters of the two main 
parties, Labour and the Conservatives. This yields a binary variable for party support which is 
considerably more straightforward to handle in a panel data regression framework than a nominal 
variable with more than two categories.  
 
Areal Units 
An important question in the study of contextual effects is how the areal units defining spatial location 
should be defined. The mechanisms through which contextual influence operates can manifest at small 
(e.g. interaction with neighbours), intermediate (e.g. party mobilization in a constituency), or large (e.g. 
regional media) spatial scales. Studies of which spatial scales influence political behaviour find 30, as in 
other substantive contexts, that choice of scale is consequential for the estimates obtained. In this study, 
we use electoral constituencies as our areal units. Constituencies are the key electoral boundary in first-
order, parliamentary elections in the UK. In England, parliamentary constituencies contain an average of 
70,000 voters, so have approximately the population size of a small city. While interpersonal interactions 
with neighbours that might result in political assimilation happen at finer-grained levels of geography, the 
constituency level should still be capable of capturing local conditions and interactions in school and 
work-place settings that require some short-range mobility. Additionally, party organizations will work to 
win a majority of the vote within the constituency boundaries and constituencies share the same MP, 
                                                          
29 Sturgis 2002. 
30 Cutts and Fieldhouse 2009; Johnston et al. 2007. 
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which suggests that the political environment within a constituency will be more internally homogenous 
compared to the country as a whole.  
Of more practical importance, however, is the fact that constituencies are the lowest 
geographical level at which it is possible to derive a useable measure of aggregate political orientation 
for the period in question. Electoral wards, which would be preferable with regard to size (they are 
smaller) are problematic because of the limited nature of information that can be attached to them and 
because their boundaries changed substantially between 1991 and 2008, rendering longitudinal analysis 
problematic. Other boundaries, such as census output areas (Martin 2008), have no feasible way of 
being linked to electoral results or to other measures of aggregate political orientation. Thus, while our 
choice of areal unit is not perfect, we believe it to be the best amongst the available alternatives. We 
return to the implications of our use of constituencies as the areal unit for the interpretation of our 
findings in the discussion section.  
While English constituency boundaries were quite stable in the period between 1991 and 2008, 
the redistricting for the 1997 general election affected a non-trivial number of constituency boundaries. 
However, most of the boundary changes affected only a small number of electors and the results we 
present here are robust to excluding observations located in constituencies which were subject to 
boundary changes during the reference period.31 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 Constituency identifiers in the BHPS are over-written with the new constituency code when boundaries change.  This 
means that it is not possible to identify which respondents in our analysis sample changed to a different constituency without 
moving house due to the 1997 boundary revisions. However, we are able to identify respondents who are resident in 
constituencies which were created in 1997 and are therefore able to estimate models including and excluding this group. We 
find no significant differences in the patterns reported in the analyses. 
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Area-level Political Orientation 
We focus on the political orientation of the constituency as the main independent variable at the 
contextual level. Our measure is based on the electoral results for the four parliamentary elections held 
in 1992, 1997, 2001, and 2005. An intuitively appealing strategy would be to define constituency-level 
political orientation as the ratio (or similar function) of the vote share of the two main parties. However, 
this is problematic because of the sometimes significant role of tactical voting and of minor parties, 
which vary across constituencies and elections. Neither would it be clear how to apply vote shares to 
constituencies in non-election years. We therefore apply a typology to constituencies, which places them 
into one of six mutually exclusive categories:32 
- Safe Conservative constituencies (N=154): The Conservative Party won a parliamentary 
seat in all four elections. 
- Safe Labour constituencies (N=211): The Labour Party won a parliamentary seat in all four 
elections.  
- Marginal Conservative constituencies (N=12): The Conservative Party won a parliamentary 
seat in three of the four elections.  
- Marginal Labour constituencies (N=111): The Labour Party won a parliamentary seat in 
three of the four elections. 
- Safe or marginal Liberal-Democrat constituencies (N=31): The Liberal-Democratic Party 
won a parliamentary seat in three or four elections. 
- Mixed constituencies (N=47): None of the three main parties won a seat in three or four of 
the elections. 
                                                          
32 In case of boundary revision, the coding matches any constituency revised in 1997 to the 1992 constituency with which it 
has the largest overlap (see Norris 2005). 
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During the period of analysis, parties other than the main three won a parliamentary seat once in eight 
constituencies33 and only in one constituency did a different party win two elections. The mixed category 
is mostly made up of constituencies in which one of the three large parties won two elections and 
another of the large parties won the other two elections. Thus, these are the most competitive 
constituencies, where no party has a clear dominance. This classification of constituencies captures 
large differences in voting patterns. For instance, in the 1992 election the Conservative party won on 
average 57 per cent of the vote in safe Conservative seats but only 33 per cent in safe Labour seats. 
The Labour party received 18 per cent of the vote in safe Conservative seats and 53 per cent in safe 
Labour seats.   
 
Residential Mobility 
In our analysis sample, we observe a total of 14,500 residential moves from one wave to the next, which 
represents an average annual move rate of just over 9% across the sample as a whole. Many of these 
relocations are, however, over a small distance within the same constituency and so would not be 
expected to result in discernible change in the external political environment. We therefore further 
restrict our definition of ‘movers’ to individuals who relocate to a different parliamentary constituency. 
This reduces the number of moves we observe by approximately half, yielding a total of 7,437. Using 
this definition, 69% of respondents do not move at all, 17.5% move once, 7% move twice and 6.5% 
move three times or more during the period of observation. 34 
                                                          
33 These are Bethnal Green and Bow, Birmingham, Sparkbrook and Small Heath, Brentwood and Ongar, East Ham, 
Staffordshire South, Tatton, West Bromwich West, West Ham. 
34 While the US is widely considered to have high rates of residential mobility, one-year mobility rates are similar to those 
observed in the UK. 12 percent of the US population moved to a different address in 2005, while 11 of the population in the 
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Table 1 shows one-year transition probabilities (as percentages) for moves between different 
constituency types. Only individuals who are observed in at least two consecutive waves can be 
included in transition tables, which results in a reduction of the sample size from 142,000 to 125,000 
observations.35 The diagonal row in Table 2 comprises observations which remained in the same 
constituency type in any 2-year period. The majority of observations do not move into different 
constituency types. However, of the 36,900 observations in safe Conservative constituencies, 315 
moved into safe Labour constituencies in a subsequent year. Similarly, of the 41,100 observations in 
safe Labour constituencies, 417 moved to a safe Conservative constituency in a subsequent year. Of 
the 28,000 observations in marginal Labour constituencies, approximately 400 moved to safe Labour 
and safe Conservative constituencies respectively.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Because the inclusion of the full set of transition probabilities results in categories with small cell 
sizes we collapse the full set of transitions into the following six categories:  
1. No move  
2. Moves from any constituency type (apart from safe Conservative) into safe Conservative 
3. Moves from any constituency type (apart from safe Labour into safe Labour 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
UK did so (Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak 2011). Data from the 2001 census and administrative records suggest that about 6.7 
million UK residents, or 11.4 per cent of the population, moved from one address to another in the previous 12 months 
(Champion 2005). Most of these moves are over short distances, with approximately two fifths moving less than 2 km away 
and only one third moving more than 10 km away. 
35 All observations in the first wave (1991) of the BHPS do not have prior information and can therefore not be used. 
Individuals who drop out of waves cannot provide transition information. 
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4. Moves from safe Conservative into safe Conservative 
5. Moves from safe Labour into safe Labour 
6. All other move types. 
 
It is moves of types 2 and 3 which are of greatest analytical interest because they represent a clear 
change in the political orientation of the area in which an individual lives.36  They can, therefore, be 
considered as ideal test-cases for theories of contextual effects. We focus our attention on these two 
move types in the analyses that follow, although analyses have been undertaken and are available upon 
request for all move types. 
 
 
Method 
To estimate the effect of moving to an area with a different political context on individual political 
preferences we use a panel data model with fixed effects and distributed lags and leads 37. We include 
lagged effects because the influence of a new area on a mover is unlikely to occur immediately, 
potentially taking several years or more to materialize. The baseline model has the following form:    
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = �MovCon′𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 𝜷−𝑘𝟓
𝒌=𝟎
+ 𝒙𝑖𝑡′𝜆 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (1) 
 
                                                          
36 In principle moves from safe Conservative to safe Labour constituencies and vice versa are of greatest theoretical interest, 
although our sample size is insufficient to go to this level of granularity. 
37 Blanden et al. 2012; Laporte and Windmeijer 2005. 
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Where the political preferences of the i-th person in the t-th year, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, are modelled as 
depending on the type of move in the preceding five years, MovCon'𝑖,𝑡−𝑘, a design vector 
corresponding to the six categories of move type described in the previous section, and “no move” as 
the reference category. Time-varying covariates are collected in the vector 𝒙𝑖𝑡. At the individual level we 
control for sex, age, age squared, educational level, income, social class, employment status, health 
status, marital status, and parental status. Where models are estimated with fixed effects, time-invariant 
characteristics such as sex are excluded. To control for spurious effects caused by unobserved 
differences between individuals that are time-invariant, each person’s observations are centred on the 
within-person mean. That is, we use time-demeaned data such that an individual’s score at time t is 
subtracted from their person specific mean over all observations across all time points (𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦�𝑖𝑡 −
𝑦��𝑖.). The well-known consequence of using time-demeaned data is that all time-invariant characteristics 
of sample units are “differenced out”, yielding the fixed effects model.  
The coefficients of primary interest in equation (1) are the lagged coefficient vectors 𝜷−𝑘 where 
k is set to a maximum of 5. The choice of a five-year maximum lag is a trade-off between our theoretical 
expectation that it may take several years for a contextual effect to be manifested and the fact that 
extending lags beyond five years results in small cell sizes and, therefore, imprecise estimates. 
Moreover, as we shall show later, increasing the number of lags to nine years does not alter our key 
substantive findings. One way of thinking about how to interpret the lagged coefficients is to consider a 
hypothetical person who moves to a safe Labour constituency one year but then moves back the next 
year: 𝛽−𝑘, labour will then be the effect on political preferences of that one-time move after k years, 
controlling for time-invariant unobserved variables and time-varying covariates. However, people 
typically stay in their new place of residence for longer than one year, so it is also of interest to know 
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what the effect of the move on preferences will be when the effect is aggregated over ensuing years. 
This “long-run effect” can be obtained by summing the coefficients over the lag vector: 
 
𝜷long-run = ∑ 𝜷−𝑘5𝑘=0        (2) 
 
Hypothesis tests of zero long-run effects can be performed by obtaining the sampling variance of 
𝜷� long-run, which by standard methods, can be shown to be:  
 
var�𝜷� long-run� = ∑ var(𝜷�−𝑘)5𝑘=0  + 2∑ cov(𝜷�−𝑘,𝜷�−𝑙)𝑘<𝑙                      (3) 
 
Note that this means that individual hypothesis tests performed on the lagged effects 𝜷−𝑘 may be non-
significant while the overall hypothesis test on 𝜷long-run is significantly greater than zero. 
By using a fixed effects model with time-varying covariates, we control for possible confounding 
due to unobserved between-person differences, as well as observed differences due to the covariates. 
Although this is already a strong research design, confounding could conceivably still occur if the 
probability of moving is correlated with the propensity to change political preferences. For example, 
becoming a parent is an event that can cause both a residential move and a change in political 
preferences. Blanden et al (2012) propose controlling for the effect of such “pre-programme trends” by 
including  ‘lead’ dummies in the model. The coefficients for the effect of the future on the present, 𝜸+𝑘, 
should not be interpreted causally, but as evidence for selection effects on the change in preferences. 
By including leads in the model, our final specification becomes: 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 = �MovCon′𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 𝜷−𝑘𝟓
𝒌=𝟎
+ �MovCon′𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 𝜸+𝑘𝟓
𝒌=𝟎
+ 𝒙𝑖𝑡′𝜆 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (4) 
 
In addition to their substantive interpretation as indicators of political selection into areas, the inclusion of 
leads also enables us to obtain estimates of the lagged effects, adjusted for non-random selection into 
areas. Thus, our control for time-constant, time-varying, as well as trend selection effects motivates the 
interpretation of the lagged coefficients 𝜷−𝑘 and their long-run versions 𝜷long-run as the effect of the 
constituency on an individual’s political preferences. Finally, it should be noted that the use of lags and 
leads in their raw form results in reduced sample size. This is because for some observations, we do not 
observe political preferences five years before and after a move. Rather than dropping such 
observations we set the unobserved prior and subsequent moves to zero and include a vector of 
‘missingness’ dummies in the model, although we do not report the coefficient estimates in our results. 
Specification tests show that our findings are substantively unaffected by the inclusion or exclusion of 
these cases. 
 
Results 
We begin by presenting some descriptive statistics before moving to more causally-focused analyses. 
An implication of contextual theories of political behaviour is that the magnitude of an assimilation effect 
should (initially at least) increase over time, because the opportunity for and experience of the various 
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influence mechanisms will grow as a function of time spent in a locale.38 Thus, we should expect the 
association between constituency type and individual policy preferences to increase over the number of 
years an individual has lived in the area. Figure 1 shows percentage support for the Conservative party 
and the mean of the left-right scale by type of constituency and the number of years the individual has 
lived at their current address.39  
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Individuals who live in safe Conservative constituencies are likely to support the Conservative 
party even immediately after moving to their new place of residence. Additionally, the longer the period 
of residence within a safe Conservative constituency, the more likely an individual is to support the 
Conservatives. Conversely, individuals in safe Labour constituencies, while considerably more likely to 
support the Labour party, show no trend toward increasing support for Labour the longer they have lived 
in a safe Labour constituency. This may be due, partially at least, to a ceiling effect because the level of 
support for Labour in safe Labour constituencies is already close to 75% at year zero. The pattern for 
the left-right scale is clearer and more consistent, with individuals in safe Conservative constituencies 
expressing more right-wing views the longer they have lived in that area and the opposite being the case 
for individuals in safe Labour constituencies. Thus, the BHPS provides quite strong preliminary evidence 
                                                          
38 A corollary example is the long-established association between the political preferences of married and co-habiting 
couples. Alford et al (2011) argue that, if the intra-spousal correlation is due to influence rather than self-selection, we should 
observe partners becoming more similar to each other the longer they are together. 
39 The time lived in constituency variable is derived from the address record rather than by self-report. We limit the upper 
bound of time at address to ten years because time at address is increasingly confounded with age as time at residence 
increases.  
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of contextual effects; people are closer to the aggregate political orientation of their constituency the 
longer they have lived in it.  However, although Figure 1 shows an apparent trend over time, the data is 
analysed cross-sectionally and the variation is, therefore, between rather than within individuals. Thus, 
the patterns we observe may have emerged due to non-random selection of individuals into (and out of) 
areas rather than to the effect of areas on individuals. It is to this possibility that we now turn via 
regression analysis. 
 Table 2 presents the results of our regression models for the left-right value scale and party 
support over ten columns, with each column representing a different model specification. In model (1) 
we include only lags, no individual-level controls and no fixed effects. Model (2) adds leads to this 
specification. Model (3) contains lags and individual level controls but no leads or fixed effects, whilst 
model (4) introduces individual fixed effects to model 3. Finally, model (5) reintroduces lead indicators. 
The same pattern is repeated for party support in models (6) to (10), though now we use a logistic link 
function because the outcome is binary. In table 2 we suppress the results for other move types (such 
as moving from a safe Conservative constituency to another safe Conservative constituency) and for the 
control variables.40 The results of these additional contrasts make no material difference to our 
substantive conclusions. In all models the reference category for the different move types is non-
movers. Thus the coefficients should be interpreted as the effect of making the move type in question on 
political preferences, compared to (covariate adjusted) non-movers.  
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
                                                          
40 These results are available from the corresponding author upon request.  
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Model (1) in table 2 shows that moving into a safe Conservative constituency from any other 
type of constituency is associated with a significant move to the right on the left-right scale (higher 
scores indicate more right-wing preferences). The long-run multiplier for this move type is 0.946 
(p<0.001), indicating significant and quite substantial contextual effects over the five years following the 
move. The magnitude of this effect is approximately equivalent to the average cross-sectional difference 
in left-right scores between a Liberal Democrat and a Conservative party identifier.  The negative 
coefficients for the effect of moving into a safe Labour constituency from other constituency types 
provides some evidence of assimilation for this type of move, though none of these is statistically 
significant, either singly or in combination. This pattern corresponds to that which was observed for the 
cross-sectional analysis in Figure 1, where the trend for Conservative support was stronger than for 
Labour support.  
Model (2) introduces lead indicators. Significant coefficients for the lead dummies suggest that, 
before controlling for other characteristics, individuals behave as if they choose their new areas, at least 
in part, on the basis of their prior political preferences. Our results suggest that those moving to safe 
Conservative areas become significantly more right-wing prior to a move. The coefficient estimates for 
those moving to safe Labour constituencies are not statistically significant, although they are of the 
correct sign (they become more left-wing). The long-run multiplier for those moving to safe Conservative 
areas between time period 0 and time period 5 has been reduced slightly to 0.845 (p<0.003), indicating 
smaller, but still substantial, assimilation effects after controlling for non-random selection into 
constituency types. However, these estimates cannot be considered causal as we have not yet 
controlled for selection on observed time-varying and time-invariant characteristics. 
In model (3), we remove the lead dummies and introduce individual level controls for 
characteristics which might lead people to relocate to a different constituency and also to change their 
political orientation. These are: age, gender, marital status, parental status, household income, social 
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class, employment status, and health status. We also include year dummies to control for macro-level 
events in the external environment. Introduction of these controls results in the lagged coefficients 
becoming somewhat reduced in magnitude, which suggests that the assimilation effects observed in 
model (1) are at least partly due to non-random selection of individuals into constituencies. Controlling 
for these individual characteristics and survey year reduces the long-run multiplier to 0.639, which 
although statistically significant (p<0.018), represents a 30% reduction in magnitude compared to model 
(1). Estimates for those moving into safe Labour constituencies change only marginally with the 
introduction of controls in model (3); these individuals become more left-wing over time, although the 
effect cannot be distinguished from zero when inference is made to the broader population (5-year 
cumulative estimate = -0.865 (p<0.772)).   
The introduction of individual fixed effects, to control for time invariant characteristics, in model 
(4) reduces the magnitude of the assimilation effects quite substantially, with the contemporaneous 
coefficient for Conservative constituency moves, in particular, reduced from 0.206 to a statistically non-
significant 0.047. However, while the majority of coefficients are reduced in magnitude, there are 
exceptions at the 3 year and 4 year lags for safe Conservative (0.139; p<0.05) and safe Labour (-0.201; 
p<0.01) constituency moves, respectively. This suggests that assimilation, rather than occurring 
immediately after a move, takes place after some years in the new location.  For safe Conservative 
constituency moves, the long-run effect is reduced to 0.428, but this is still statistically different from zero 
(p<0.011). For Labour, the long-run multiplier is -0.200 (p<0.310) which suggests that the small apparent 
assimilation effect observed after 4 years is removed when combined with the effects in the other years.  
Finally, model (5) re-introduces lead dummies in order to control for all forms of self-selection in 
one model. Results suggest that re-introducing the leads has only a small effect on the estimates. The 
leads are statistically non-significant for those moving to safe Conservative constituencies and have little 
effect on the coefficient estimates of model (4). The long-run multiplier becomes marginally non-
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significant in model (5). However, none of the lead coefficients in model (5) are themselves significantly 
different from zero; hence our preferred estimates are those in model (4). For those moving to safe 
Labour constituencies, however, there is some limited evidence of political self-selection; two years prior 
to a move, individuals moving to a safe Labour constituency become somewhat more left-wing, 
suggesting that move choice is related to prior shifts in political orientation, though the magnitude of the 
effect is weak. Moreover, political self-selection has no material effect on our conclusions regarding 
assimilation for those moving to safe Labour constituencies, with the magnitude and significance of the 
coefficients unaltered by the introduction of the leads. 
We now turn to the results for party identification, which are presented in models (6) to (10) in 
table 2. It should be noted that the sample size for some of these models is reduced substantially 
compared to the linear specifications in models (1) to (5). This is because relatively few individuals 
changed their party identification between Labour and the Conservatives during the period of 
observation and only individuals who change on the outcome contribute to the parameter estimates in a 
fixed effects model. We must therefore be cautious in our interpretation of these models, because our 
power of inference is weak.  
The pattern of coefficients across models (6) to (10) is quite similar to that found for the left-right 
scale models. There is evidence in the ‘naïve’ models (6), (7) and (8) of political assimilation for 
individuals moving into safe Conservative constituencies but only weak and inconsistent support for an 
effect of moves into safe Labour constituencies. Once individual fixed effects are introduced in models 
(9) and (10), there is no evidence of assimilation occurring for either type of move. Indeed, these results 
suggest that individuals moving to safe Conservative constituencies become less likely to support the 
Conservative party over time, although these estimates are not statistically significant. Long-run 
multiplier coefficients for those moving into safe Conservative and safe Labour constituencies are also 
not statistically distinguishable from zero.  
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Because the BHPS has 18 waves of data, it is possible to extend the annual lagged and 
cumulative effects beyond 5 years after a move. Presentation of these models in tabular form is 
cumbersome, so we show them in graphical summary form in Figures 2 and 3. We present estimates 
corresponding to the left-right scale models (1) and (4) and party support models (6) and (9) with 9 lags 
instead of 5. This provides a contrast between naive estimation (lags only model) and estimation which 
is more robust to potential confounders.41 Figure 2 shows the effect of moving to safe Conservative and 
Labour constituencies on left-right attitudes up to 9 years after a move.  
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
These longer-run estimates produce similar results to those presented in Table 2; a long-run effect is 
apparent for left-right attitudes for those moving to a safe Conservative constituency in the model with 
individual-level controls only. However, once individual fixed effects and time-varying individual level 
characteristics are controlled for, this long-run effect is approximately halved. There is no commensurate 
effect on left-right attitudes for individuals moving to safe Labour constituencies, with or without fixed 
effects. The models for party support in Figure 3 also suggest the presence of an assimilation effect for 
individuals moving to safe Conservative constituencies, but these are statistically non-significant when 
individual fixed effects are added to the model. No evidence of assimilation effects is evident for 
individuals who move to safe Labour constituencies, even before the inclusion of fixed effects.   
 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
                                                          
41 The overall pattern is very similar when using different specifications, e.g. when plotting estimates from table 2 with 5 lags 
or from lag and lead models. The additional plots are available upon request. 
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Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper we have taken a new approach to addressing an enduring controversy in the study of 
political behaviour. While theories which posit a causal effect of geographical context on individual 
political preferences have a long tradition in political science, existing studies have yet to provide 
convincing evidence that individuals do indeed assimilate, over time, to the majority preferences of the 
areas in which they live. Our analyses advance the existing state-of-the art in this field by tracking the 
political preferences of a large sample of individuals over an 18 year period. Our analysis used panel 
data models with fixed effects and controls for time-varying individual characteristics. This longitudinal 
approach yields a considerably stronger protection against the primary threat to valid causal inference in 
standard cross-sectional designs, namely that individuals choose which areas they wish to move to (and 
remain in) and that these choices are themselves correlated with political preferences.  
Our results suggest that political assimilation effects were evident in England during the period 
1991-2008 but that these were weak and differential across different types of areas. On the one hand, 
movers to safe Conservative seats became more economically right-wing and more likely to vote 
Conservative following the move. This suggests that, consistent with the predictions of contextual 
theories of political behaviour, moving to a more conservative area leads individuals to become more 
aligned in their political preferences with the local majority. On the other hand, we found no change in 
left-right attitudes and only very weak evidence of change in party identification amongst movers to safe 
Labour constituencies.  
Several factors may account for the differential assimilation effects across constituency types. 
First, people who move to a safe Labour area already have a high probability of voting for the Labour 
Party and of having economically left-wing attitudes. Thus, the contingent nature of our findings may be 
due to a ceiling effect; there is little scope for movers into Labour areas to become more left-wing than 
they already are immediately prior to moving. An alternative possibility is that the mechanisms through 
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which contextual effects are manifested are less powerful in safe Labour seats. Safe Labour seats are 
mostly located in urban areas such as London, Birmingham, Manchester, Newcastle, and Liverpool. The 
social pressure to conform to the local majority may be less strong in socially diverse, urban areas than 
in more homogeneous rural or suburban areas.42 Conservatives, who traditionally value conformity to 
existing social norms, may be more likely than those on the left to pressure newcomers to conform to 
the local majority position. These possibilities are, however, speculative and it is not possible to 
establish, with the data available to us, why moving to a Conservative area has an effect on political 
preferences, while moving to a Labour context does not. Be that as it may, the finding that contexts have 
heterogeneous effects is important in its own right because it suggests that it is necessary, for a 
complete account, to clearly specify the conditions under which we should expect areal units to affect 
political preferences.  
With regard to selection into areas, previous studies have demonstrated that American movers, 
on average, relocate into areas with more congruent political beliefs than the constituencies from which 
they moved.43 Our results show that this kind of geographic sorting generalizes to the British context; an 
individual’s existing political preference is a strong and significant predictor of the political orientation of 
the area to which move. However, the finding that citizens relocate to constituencies that are more 
congruent with their existing political beliefs does not imply that the choice of locale is caused by political 
orientation. In our analysis, when individual level controls are introduced, political preferences prior to 
the time of moving no longer predict the political orientation of the destination constituency. This 
                                                          
42 Labour constituencies are on average poorer, younger, and have more residents who are renters, have a low education, 
and are unemployed, but there is more variation in these characteristics across Labour constituencies than across 
Conservative constituencies. 
43 Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2012; Gimpel 1999; McDonald 2011. 
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suggests that sorting of politically like-minded individuals into areas arises indirectly, because people 
with different political preferences also have different socio-economic characteristics which are the 
actual causal determinants of residential location choices. In short, self-selection into areas appears to 
be almost entirely non-political in nature.  
While our study significantly improves on previous attempts to identify contextual effects, it has 
limitations of its own which should be acknowledged. In particular our choice of areal unit (Westminster 
constituencies) can be criticized for inadequately representing the spatial scale at which the 
mechanisms generally thought to underlie assimilation are likely to operate. Neighbourhood effects 
theories generally contend that context effects operate primarily through social-psychological processes, 
such as interpersonal influence and persuasion which are likely to happen at smaller spatial scales than 
a parliamentary constituency. Using smaller areal units would almost certainly result in different 
estimates of assimilation and selection effects than those we have presented here.44 While we 
acknowledge that this problem is pertinent to the interpretation of our findings, we do not believe that it 
invalidates our findings and conclusions. As we have argued, the constituency is a substantively 
important context because it is the relevant electoral scale in parliamentary elections and political parties 
are incentivised to target mobilization efforts strategically across constituencies. In addition, the fact that 
we find evidence consistent with contextual effects for movers to Conservative constituencies suggests 
that the null results for some mover types are not due merely to the use of a large aerial unit. While we 
cannot conclude that our results will necessarily generalize across different spatial scales, or to different 
political contexts, this is not something that we should expect to be the case in any event. The 
modifiable areal unit problem should not, in short, be taken as a threat to the validity of our conclusions 
as it is equally pertinent to any spatial scale that an analyst happens to, or is able to select.  
                                                          
44 Fotheringham and Wong 1991. 
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A second limitation of our approach is that it overlooks other important ways in which 
assimilation is likely to take place. In particular, our focus on adult movers means that we cannot draw 
conclusions about two important groups: young people and those who reside in the same area (or same 
type of area) for long periods. The places where people live in their childhood, adolescence, and early 
adulthood are likely to shape their political outlook more profoundly than at other times in their lives.45 
Because we focus only on adults aged eighteen and over, we would not detect effects which occur prior 
to adulthood. And, although it would, in principle, be possible to break our analyses down across age 
groups, in practice our sample of movers is too small to be able to reliably detect differences between 
age groups that might exist in the population. Similarly, it is plausible that contextual effects occur for 
individuals who never move but are nonetheless influenced by the changing political environment within 
their own locale over time. However, identification of causal assimilation effects for non-movers is a 
considerably more challenging analytical task than for a sample of movers and consideration of this 
important group is beyond the scope of this paper.  
A third limitation of our research is that it only addresses one possible source of heterogeneity in 
treatment effects (the political hue of the destination constituency). Both individual and contextual 
characteristics may influence the extent to which individuals adopt the political preferences prevalent in 
their local environments. For instance, the reasons why individuals move - such as getting a new job, 
moving to a more family-friendly neighbourhood, or attending university – may themselves shape the 
propensity to assimilate to the new context. Very stable local communities may affect newcomers in 
different ways than gentrifying communities or places that are growing fast over a specific period of time. 
Long-distance moves may have different implications for political preferences than short-distance moves 
because it is easier to maintain pre-existing social networks.  
                                                          
45 Campbell 2006; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009. Campbell 2006; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009. 
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While we acknowledge, then, that our conclusions cannot be generalized without  appropriate 
caution to other spatial levels or to other population sub-groups, we believe that our findings are 
important nevertheless. The evidence that we have presented suggests that self-selection into areas is 
considerably more important than assimilation effects in producing the spatial clustering of political 
preferences long observed by political geographers. This confirms the dominance of selection over 
assimilation that has been observed in other contexts, including those which have used experimental 
designs (Katz, Kling, and Liebman 2001; Ludwig et al. 2008; Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschfield 2001). We 
have also shown for the first time that self-selection into areas is almost entirely non-political in nature, in 
the sense that individuals do not choose where to live on the basis of political preference per se, but as 
a result of socio-economic characteristics which are jointly correlated with choice of location and political 
orientation. Location affects individual political preferences, but only weakly, in some areas, and for 
some outcomes. Thus, while contexts are certainly relevant to our understanding of political 
preferences, they appear to be considerably less important than proponents of contextual theories have 
sometimes maintained.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: BHPS Constituency Transition Probabilities   
 
BHPS 1991-2008. Total number of moves over all transition pair-years and the average percentage of respondents 
transitioning in such pair-years.  
Time Period, t Safe Con Safe Lab Safe Lib Marg Con Marg Lab Mixed Total
Safe Con 35,985 315 105 32 303 196 36,936
97.43 0.85 0.28 0.09 0.82 0.53 100
Safe Lab 417 39,969 104 32 505 124 41,151
1.01 97.13 0.25 0.08 1.23 0.30 100
Safe Lib 123 91 5,531 3 59 33 5,840
2.11 1.56 94.71 0.05 1.01 0.57 100
Marg Con 38 17 3 1,543 15 9 1,625
2.34 1.05 0.18 94.95 0.92 0.55 100
Marg Lab 437 483 83 20 26,756 125 27,904
1.57 1.73 0.30 0.07 95.89 0.45 100
Mixed 174 113 38 13 141 11,083 11,562
1.50 0.98 0.33 0.11 1.22 95.86 100
Total 37,174 40,988 5,864 1,643 27,779 11,570 125,018
29.73 32.79 4.69 1.31 22.22 9.25 100
Time Period, t +1
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 Table 2: Panel Regression Models for Political assimilation and selection effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Leads
t+5, 5 yrs after any to safe con 0.191* -0.011 1.467*** 1.353
(0.095) (0.064) (0.160) (0.430)
t+4, 4 yrs after any to safe con 0.188* -0.016 1.675*** 1.319
(0.089) (0.058) (0.169) (0.376)
t+3, 3 yrs after any to safe con 0.166* -0.078 1.414*** 1.114
(0.078) (0.056) (0.133) (0.282)
t+2, 2 yrs after any to safe con 0.153* -0.049 1.499*** 0.967
(0.070) (0.055) (0.130) (0.249)
t+1, 1 yr after any to safe con 0.051 -0.024 1.297** 1.166
Contemporaneous (0.070) (0.052) (0.105) (0.286)
t0, yr of move any to safe con 0.253*** 0.230** 0.206** 0.047 0.035 1.521*** 1.456*** 1.593*** 1.114 1.124
Lags (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.051) (0.053) (0.123) (0.120) (0.139) (0.258) (0.281)
t-1, 1 yrs before any to safe con 0.159* 0.130 0.147 0.085 0.065 1.414*** 1.354*** 1.471*** 1.047 1.080
(0.084) (0.083) (0.083) (0.054) (0.057) (0.120) (0.117) (0.136) (0.246) (0.269)
t-2, 2 yrs before any to safe con 0.156* 0.129 0.107 0.020 -0.001 1.329** 1.285** 1.380** 0.744 0.750
(0.079) (0.079) (0.076) (0.057) (0.059) (0.120) (0.118) (0.138) (0.190) (0.200)
t-3, 3 yrs before any to safe con 0.207* 0.190* 0.133 0.139* 0.130* 1.235* 1.209* 1.198 0.865 0.899
(0.089) (0.088) (0.085) (0.059) (0.061) (0.117) (0.117) (0.124) (0.226) (0.243)
t-4, 4 yrs before any to safe con 0.176 0.173 0.115 0.045 0.025 1.206 1.185 1.271* 0.620 0.654
(0.095) (0.096) (0.091) (0.065) (0.067) (0.122) (0.122) (0.143) (0.164) (0.179)
t-5, 5 yrs before any to safe con -0.001 -0.007 -0.050 0.088 0.073 1.197 1.180 1.250* 0.821 0.843
(0.098) (0.098) (0.091) (0.066) (0.068) (0.120) (0.120) (0.135) (0.215) (0.228)
Leads
t+5, 5 yrs after any to safe lab -0.056 0.108 0.840 0.765
(0.105) (0.080) (0.105) (0.261)
t+4, 4 yrs after any to safe lab 0.071 0.066 0.723** 0.656
(0.093) (0.065) (0.088) (0.229)
t+3, 3 yrs after any to safe lab -0.127 -0.060 0.871 0.954
(0.089) (0.068) (0.095) (0.315)
t+2, 2 yrs after any to safe lab -0.086 -0.166** 0.869 0.770
(0.081) (0.063) (0.089) (0.251)
t+1, 1 yr after any to safe lab -0.065 -0.022 0.912 1.116
Contemporaneous (0.070) (0.059) (0.085) (0.328)
t0, yr of move any to safe lab -0.025 -0.004 0.045 -0.003 -0.022 0.870 0.930 1.071 1.376 1.323
Lags (0.083) (0.082) (0.080) (0.059) (0.062) (0.083) (0.091) (0.109) (0.393) (0.403)
t-1, 1 yrs before any to safe lab -0.102 -0.078 -0.056 0.006 -0.017 0.924 0.959 1.091 0.927 0.863
(0.089) (0.088) (0.086) (0.062) (0.065) (0.093) (0.096) (0.117) (0.267) (0.265)
t-2, 2 yrs before any to safe lab -0.017 -0.014 0.011 0.004 -0.014 0.861 0.875 1.005 0.994 0.970
(0.098) (0.098) (0.097) (0.067) (0.070) (0.092) (0.094) (0.118) (0.301) (0.310)
t-3, 3 yrs before any to safe lab 0.063 0.062 0.071 0.040 0.029 0.857 0.864 1.040 0.891 0.866
(0.093) (0.094) (0.092) (0.067) (0.070) (0.097) (0.098) (0.125) (0.270) (0.275)
t-4, 4 yrs before any to safe lab -0.159 -0.159 -0.155 -0.201** -0.216** 0.790 0.793 0.789 0.568 0.538
(0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.078) (0.080) (0.097) (0.099) (0.110) (0.196) (0.192)
t-5, 5 yrs before any to safe lab -0.034 -0.017 -0.004 -0.046 -0.071 0.958 0.960 1.107 0.784 0.764
(0.117) (0.118) (0.118) (0.078) (0.081) (0.124) (0.126) (0.154) (0.264) (0.271)
Other move types yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual controls no no yes yes yes no no yes yes yes
Individual fixed effects no no no yes yes no no no yes yes
Leads no yes no no yes no yes no no yes
Constant 0.041* 0.088*** 0.665*** 0.222* 0.277*  -1.124* 0.830***  -0.808* n/a n/a
(0.017) (0.022) (0.133) (0.105) (0.108) (0.260) (0.019) (0.200) n/a n/a
Long-run multiplier effects (lags)
Any to safe Con (t0 + t1 + t2 +t3 +t4 +t5) 0.945*** 0.845** 0.639** 0.428* 0.326 5.092*** 4.282** 6.154*** 0.382 0.451
(0.281) (0.283) (0.268) (0.167) (0.188) (2.297) (1.973) (2.896) (0.296) (0.402)
Any to safe Lab (t0 + t1 + t2 +t3 +t4 +t5) -0.274 -0.211 -0.088 -0.200 -0.120 0.449 0.513 1.066 0.502 0.394
(0.303) (0.303) (0.302) (0.197) (0.227) (0.238) (0.275) (0.585) (0.500) (0.450)
N 49105 49105 48974 48974 48974 78573 78573 72979 15542 15542
Cluster standard errors in parentheses;  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001. Additional move types include safe con to safe con , safe lab to safe lab  and 
other mover types . Individual controls include: Age, gender, education, marital status, children, income, class status, employment status, part/full-time, 
health status and time dummies. Coefficients in models 1 to 5 are Ordinary Least Squares, in models 6 to 10 coefficients are odds ratios. Note that the long-
run multiplier for models 6 to 10 is derived by summing the exponetiated logit coefficients and converting this to odds ratios rather than summing the individual 
odds ratios
Left-right' score Supports Conservative PartyMove type (reference - 
no move)
Timing of move relative to 
preference
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Figure 1: Party Identification and left-right economic values over time lived in constituency 
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 Figure 2 Assimilation to Left-Right values by type of moves over time with extended lags 
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Figure 3 Assimilation to Conservative Party support by type of moves over time with extended lags 
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Appendix 
The six-point Likert scale questions used to derive the ‘left-right’ value scale are: (Strongly Disagree/Disagree / 
Not Agree or Disagree / Agree / Strongly Agree) 
 ‘wOPPSOCA’: Ordinary working people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth  
 (13.65% / 49.63% / 19.93% / 16.00% / 0.73%) 
‘wOPPSOCB’: There is one law for the rich and one for the poor 
(17.45% / 50.46% / 15.56% / 14.70% / 1.84%) 
‘wOPPSOCC’: Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain’s economic problems 
(4.73% / 29.22% / 37.67% / 25.14% / 3.23%) 
‘wOPPSOCD’: Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership 
(6.11% / 32.92% / 29.08% / 27.78% / 4.11%) 
‘wOPPSOCE’: It is government’s responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one  
(7.11% / 39.63% / 16.19% / 32.31% / 4.77%) 
‘wOPPSOCF’: There is no need for strong trade unions to protect employees’ working conditions and 
wages  
(10.04% / 45.69% / 20.21% / 19.94% / 4.12%) 
 
Table A1: Summary of the derived ‘left-right value’ scale 
Year Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
1991 0.000 1.53 7,419 
1993 0.000 1.53 6,807 
1995 0.000 1.54 6,743 
1997 0.000 1.46 8,050 
2000 0.000 1.39 7,684 
2004 0.000 1.39 6,372 
2007 0.000 1.36 6,030 
Total 0.000 1.46 42,930 
 
